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you saw in black and white

when there was actually a rainbow
it was never even

gray
-desiree ellen'
I. INTRODUCTION

You have no doubt heard the narrative before. Boy meets girl. Boy and girl
fall in love. Boy and girl get married. But the reality this narrative seeks to
represent is not as simple as mainstream society seems to desire.
Take, for example, the story of Jeffrey2 and Alyson.3 When Jeffrey and
Alyson met in October 2004, they immediately connected.4 After spending some
time together, their friendship developed into a romantic relationship.5 According
to Alyson, her relationship with Jeffrey became serious, intense, and emotional.6
However, had Alyson and Jeffrey sought to be married, the opportunity would
have been unavailable to them; they were fighting against the prevailing, cleanly
defined boy-meets-girl narrative.
Prior to meeting Jeffrey, Alyson came out as a lesbian.7 By definition, a
lesbian is supposed to be attracted to other women.8 But what is it, exactly, about
a woman to which a lesbian is attracted? If it is a matter of mere biology or
anatomy, how does one explain Alyson's attraction to Jeffrey, a post-operative9
female-to-male transsexual?' ° Or, put bluntly, how does one explain the attraction
1. desiree ellen, if i could hate you, Nov. 27, 2004 (unpublished poem, on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
2. Some names have been changed out of respect for individuals' privacy.
3. Telephone interview with Alyson Ryan (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Ryan Interview] (notes on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See MSN Encarta Dictionary, Lesbian Definition, MSN ENCARTA, http://encarta.msn.com/
dictionary 1861696246/lesbian.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(defining "lesbian" as "homosexual woman: a woman who is sexually attracted to other women").
9. See infra note 10 (stating that "post-operative" can refer to various stages in the transition process).
10. See Shannon Minter, The Transgender Umbrella: One View, in ADVANCEMENTS IN STATE AND
FEDERAL LAW REGARDING TRANSGENDER EMPLOYEES 18 (Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights & Transgender Law
Ctr. 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining transgender as an umbrella term, which "includes
transsexual people, cross-dressers, transvestites, drag queens, butch lesbians, feminine gay men, and even more
generally any women who have so called masculine characteristics and any men who have so called feminine
characteristics"). "The underlying idea or concept is that 'transgender' includes anyone whose behavior,
appearance, or identity falls outside of gender stereotypes or outside of stereotypical assumptions about how
men and women are supposed to be. It is a very broad term that includes a very wide range of people." Id.; see
also S.F. Hum. Rights Comm'n, Compliance Guidelines to Prohibit Gender Identity Discrimination, in
ADVANCEMENTS IN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW REGARDING TRANSGENDER EMPLOYEES 19 (Nat'l Ctr. for
Lesbian Rights & Transgender Law Ctr. 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter
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a lesbian feels for a self-identifying, outwardly-appearing male who happens to
have a vagina?"
Alyson's story presents a situation where language fails to accommodate
adequately the complexity of the narrative of gender involved. This Comment
seeks to demonstrate how our sexual and gender discourse falls short in
accounting for the diversity of people and the rainbow of desire that actually
exist.'2 Sexual discourse, as it exists today, recognizes a series of binaries that
situates people as either man or woman, heterosexual or homosexual. But, as
with any binary, the insistence on two opposing terms suggests a space between
or, as with sexuality, a range of possibilities masked by language that does not
adequately recognize such possibilities. Because conventional language lacks the
vocabulary to account for these sexual identities, and because language
necessarily serves as a representation of identity, people like Alyson and Jeffrey
are linguistically, and thus culturally, coerced to identify (or be perceived) as one
or the other in a variety of culturally constructed binaries. Moreover, because of
the importance the law attaches to legal categories, language,
particularly the
3
language in the law, perpetuates this coercive problem.
Both personal and legal identities are necessarily dependent on the system of
classification applied. The problems that arise from the failure of binary terms,
such as "gay," "straight," "male," and "female," to account for the reality of
people's identities are not limited to Alyson's personal anxiety to fit within these
socially constructed binaries. Indeed, in the current legal climate, whether Alyson
is perceived as a lesbian, and whether Jeffrey is characterized as a man or a
woman, has significant legal, and thus real-world, consequences. 14 For example,

Definitions] (stating that a transsexual is someone who falls within a subset of the transgender umbrella and
whose gender identity (psychologically and emotionally) does not correspond to the sex identified at birth).
Transsexuals may or may not be taking steps to reconcile the perceived difference between their anatomical sex
and gender identity. Id.
A variety of degrees exist to which a transsexual can transition. A post-operative transsexual may only
have undergone partial gender confirmation surgery. Id. For instance, a post-operative female-to-male
transsexual may only have undergone "top surgery" (i.e. a mastectomy) and begun hormone treatment. Id. Such
was the case with Jeffrey. See Ryan Interview, supra note 3 (stating that Jeffrey still has a vagina).
Throughout this paper, pronouns will correspond to the person's gender identity, unless otherwise
indicated.
11. See Katherine Rachlin, Factors Which Influence Individual'sDecisions When Considering Femaleto-Male Genital Reconstructive Surgery, 3 INT'L J. TRANSGENDERISM 3, 9 (1999) (stating that the majority of
participants in the sample rejected phalloplasty, the construction of a penis, in favor of metoidioplasty, the
construction of a smaller penis in which the clitoris is released from its hood). "Most reported that they did so
because the present technology was in some way inadequate or because of cost. It is interesting to note that
none of the individuals in the transsexual group rejected surgical options because they were satisfied with their
own body. They wanted male genitals, if only they were attainable." Id.
12. See generally KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US (1st
Vintage Book ed. 1995); JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004).
13. Such categorical language in the law produces special consequences as well, dictating not only who
may marry whom, but also for what benefits someone is eligible or whether one will be criminally cited for
using the women's bathroom.
14. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (holding a post-operative
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in the context of marriage, many states prohibit two people from marrying on the
basis of their gender; the law is ill-equipped to deal with a person who does not
fit neatly in one category of gender or the other."
Marriage-its history, its traditions, and its availability-has been the subject
of much debate throughout our nation's recent history. 6 The subject has become
quite controversial.' 7 This should not be surprising considering the cultural
Mnythology surrounding the institution of marriage. Indeed, everyone seems to
have an opinion about marriage. Arguably, this is partially due to the various
experiences each person has with marriage in one form or another.
The romanticization of marriage persists despite high divorce rates,'8 couples
marrying for financial benefits or due to unplanned pregnancies, and seemingly
meaningless and spontaneous marriages, such as that of Britney Spears.' 9
Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. observes,
Americans are romantics. We fantasize about finding our "one true
love." For most of us, that fantasy culminates in a proposal of marriage, a
religious ceremony, and a honeymoon. In the fairy-tale romance the
couple live happily ever after, sharing mutual love, perhaps creating a
larger family, and parting only at death. Reality is seldom as good as
fantasy, but the attractions of marriage maintain a powerful hold on our
imagination and aspirations. 0

male-to-female transsexual to be a male for marital purposes). The court looked to chromosomal factors in its
determination. Id. at 227. But cf Vecchione v. Vecchione, Civ. No. 96D003769 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 25, 1997)
("[A] post-operative transsexual male, one born female, but having gone through the transgender surgery, is in
fact, a male based on the court's reading of [California's] Health & Safety Code § 103425, et seq.") (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)) (defining marriage as a union between a man and a
woman).
15. See Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can't Take It With You: Constitutional Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819 (2005) (discussing the "constitutional
implications of the[] varied approaches to determining a person's legal sex"). This also would be the case when
dealing with intersex people, "individuals who are born with some male and some female sexual characteristics,
particularly an anomaly of the external genitalia or internal reproductive organs." Definitions,supra note 10.
16. As evidenced, for example, by marriage laws prohibiting interracial marriage prior to Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Indeed, one need only to look at the current debate regarding marriage equality, and the subsequent
backlash by opposition groups, as an example.
18. CBS News, No Fault Divorce Hits Resistance, Some States Move to Make Divorce More Difficult,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/01/national/main670762.shtnml (last visited Sept. 2, 2006)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing some states' attempts to make divorce more difficult in
response to high divorce rates).
19. See CNN.com, Britney Spears MarriageAnnulled, available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOW
BIZIMusic/01/05/britney.spears.wedding.ap/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (detailing Britney Spears' marriage and annulment to childhood friend, Jason Alexander).
20.

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO

CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 1

(1996).
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The law has protected this reverential posture towards marriage. In Loving v.
Virginia, the United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.",2' "Marriage," the Court held, "is one
of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and
survival."22

Within the confines of marriage, the state has a recognized interest in
promoting stable familial units in which two people devote their lives to each
other and the union. For example, the law has sought to encourage marriage as
the site of committed relationships, 3 fidelity,24 and child rearing.25 Indeed, "upon
[marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social
relations and social obligations and duties. 2 6 It is crucial, then, that the
opportunity to enter into such a relationship be afforded equally and equitably to
all people.
The purpose of this Comment is not to propose an entirely new system for
the Sisyphean problems inherent in the institution of marriage as it exists today,
but rather to address and call into question one particular aspect of marriage-the
notion that a couple consists of a man and a woman.
As mentioned, this Comment recognizes that the law depends on the ability
to define, classify, and categorize the world. While this Comment intends to call
into question the current binary structure used to categorize sex, gender, and
sexual orientation, it does not advocate a complete erasure of categories. To do
so would be fictional, not to mention impossible.27 Rather, it will demonstrate the
21. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
22. Id. The Loving Court eliminated discrimination against interracial marriage by recognizing the
fundamental nature of marriage to humankind. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to extend that principle to
all humankind. Compare that situation with the opening paragraph of Romer v. Evans:
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution "neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 41 L. Ed. 256, 16 S.
Ct. 1138 (1896) (dissenting opinion). Unheeded then, those words now are understood to state a
commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake. The Equal Protection
Clause enforces this principle and today requires us to hold invalid a provision of Colorado's
Constitution.
517 U.S. 620 (1996). There, Justice Kennedy implicitly linked the past wrongdoing of the 1896 Plessy decision
(e.g., sanctioning racism and "separate but equal") with the prospective wrongdoing that would have occurred
in 1996 to homosexuals; arguably, both Plessy and the current treatment of homosexuals in the fight for
marriage equality violate the law's commitment to equal treatment.
23. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) ("Civil marriage anchors
an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones.").
24. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (upholding a presumption under California
law that a child bom to a married woman is presumed to be the child of that marriage).
25. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (holding that a state could constitutionally deny
an unwed father the right to veto the adoption of his illegitimate child by the mother's husband where the
unwed father had "never exercised actual or legal custody over [the] child," thus suggesting that the marital
relationship was the best site for raising a child).
26. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1879).
27. That is, without categories, there would be no common language with which to speak.
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ways current dichotomies, such as penis/vagina, male/female, and gay/straight,
are false dichotomies; they suggest an either/or relationship between merely two
options, whereas, in reality, multiple options exist. By revealing the inadequacy
of these binaries, this Comment suggests that gender as a basis for marriage fails
to provide a meaningful distinction.
The goal of this Comment is to find a balance between the need for
definitions within the legal system and the need for a language representative of
all identity. As Judith Butler points out in her reading of Kate Bornstein's
discussion on transsexual desire, "it seems crucial to realize that a livable life
does require various degrees of stability. In the same way that a life for which no
categories of recognition exist is not a livable life, so a life for which those
categories constitute unlivable constraint is not an acceptable option. 2 8
Currently, the legal system fails in both respects because it forces those with "no
categories of recognition" into categories in which they do not quite fit and then
regulates their lives accordingly. 29 Butler goes on to say, "[w]hat is most
important is to cease legislating for all lives what is livable only for some, and
similarly, to refrain from proscribing for all lives what is unlivable for some."3 °
Categories seem necessary for identity to be recognized,3' and thus, the erasure of
existing categories cannot solve the problem. Therefore, a new, broader
definitional system is necessary so as to incorporate our shifting understanding of
gender and sexuality. This Comment, then, calls for candid and open-ended
discourse in light of the inadequacy of the current binary system to provide
equality for all people.
Part II of this Comment will delve further into Alyson's story and the cultural
and linguistic problems that the story brings to light. Part III will then shift into a
discussion of the case law as it relates to the categories of sexual orientation and
gender identity, particularly within the context of marriage. This part will explore
the narrative assumptions these cases make and it seeks to expose the underlying
anxieties such assumptions attempt to hide. The part will further demonstrate the
inadequacy of each case to provide an equitable result for a couple like Alyson
and Jeffrey. By deconstructing the notion of gender as a binary, this Comment, in
Part IV, proposes that the gender distinctions on which marriage laws are
currently based are not meaningful. Consequently, it suggests a nuanced and
candid discussion to move toward finding a better solution. Throughout, this
Comment will ground its analysis in Alyson's story, using both legal and
theoretical lenses through which to view these issues.

28.

BUTLER, supra note 12, at 8.

29. See id. (discussing the necessity for livable categories of recognition).
30. Id.
31. Without language with which to speak about a person, identity, at least externally, cannot be named.
Without language to name, the identity falls outside language and thus experience as well. See infra notes 69-81
and accompanying text (discussing language and taboo).
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II. THE PROBLEM OF THE BINARY IN DISCOURSES OF SEXUAL
AND GENDER IDENTITY

A. The Problem of the Binary in NarratingSexual Identity
constantly longing
for a definition, i
would anchor to
anything within reach,
then self-impose the
boundaries•...
... i realize the definition
falls short, not 3myself
2
-desiree ellen
As desiree ellen's poem illustrates, coming out in a predominantly binary
society forces one to face a problem of definitions.33 Not only does the
availability of merely two options (i.e., heterosexual or homosexual) suggest that
one must fit in one category or the other (and preferably one over the other), but
some individuals also impose such labels on themselves. For Alyson, coming out
was a very difficult process.34 While she started coming out to friends in 1998,
she did not come out to her family until the summer of 2004."5 desiree ellen's
poem captures one of the struggles Alyson faced-Alyson longed for a
definition, for language that adequately could express her identity, but "the
definition [fell] short., 36 By self-identifying as a lesbian, Alyson began to feel
constrained by her own definition, such that to identify otherwise would give her
less credibility.37
Perhaps one of the reasons Alyson had such a difficult process coming out is
because she recognized, and therefore resisted, the inadequacy of the choices
between heterosexual and homosexual. Still, while Alyson may have
acknowledged the limits of the choices available to her, she declined to deviate
from the discourse already in place; she chose "lesbian" from among the
available options. Arguably, however, "choosing" lesbian may not necessarily be
a meaningful choice. In "orientation," desiree ellen wrote: "orientation comes in
a drop-down menu / select a single word / and no disclaimer or / justification

32. desiree ellen, frustration by the bottle, Aug. 13, 2005 (unpublished poem, on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) [hereinafter frustration by the bottle].
33. See id.
34. Ryan Interview, supra note 3.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also desiree ellen, orientation, Nov. 11, 2004 (unpublished poem, on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) [hereinafter orientation].
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explanation / allowed."3 This language suggests the lack of nuance in the
options, particularly because of the stereotypes associated with each choice: "of
the available options / i selected lesbian / because it fit / how i see myself, / not
because i wanted to fit / your cookie cutter / single-sized stereotype." 9 In closing
the poem, desiree ellen questions, "what / word would possibly fit / in the
multiple-choice / select-the-best-answer / drop-down / coded to put getting / -toknow-you / on a page.""
According to Michel Foucault, sexuality is a historical construct.4' Foucault
suggests that, beginning in about the eighteenth century, we can begin to trace
four strategic unities that "formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power
centering on sex. 4 2 He describes the first as "[a] hysterization of women's
bodies,"4'3 the second as "[a] pedagogization of children's sex,""4 the third as "[a]
socialization of procreative behavior," 5 and the fourth as "[a] psychiatrization of
perverse pleasure.4 6 From these sexual discourses emerged four figures: "the
hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the
perverse adult."4' 7 These figures became "privileged objects of knowledge" '
about which people could discuss deviant sexuality as something apart from
themselves. At issue, Foucault writes, "was the very production of sexuality.
Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to
hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to
uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct." '
Inherent in this idea is that power relations (here, the suggestion that
heterosexuality is normal) help to produce certain kinds of discourses (such as
the sexual discourse positing, relationally, that homosexuality is abnormal)."
These discourses simultaneously support the power relations.5 ' That is, the
present binary system maintains its own power.
To Foucault, sexuality is a
52
product of the discourse that sought to repress it.

38. orientation, supra note 37.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41.

MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 105 (Robert Hurley, trans.,

Vintage Books ed. 1978).
42. Id. at 103.
43. Id. at 104.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 105.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.at 97.
51. Id.
52. Id. at53.
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Taking this point further, if sexuality is a historical construct as Foucault
suggests, so too is the view of the homosexual as a distinct type of person.53
Indeed, Foucault posits that such a shift occurred in the nineteenth century:
This new persecution of the peripheral sexualities entailed an
incorporationof perversions and a new specification of individuals. As
defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category
of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical
subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a
personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood .... Nothing that went
into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. . . . The
sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a
species."
To Foucault, sexuality is not the basis of one's identity.5 Yet, at the moment the
homosexual became a distinct person, sexuality became equated with identity. 6
This relationship between sexuality and identity creates a power structure that
cannot be broken down without challenging the relational binary on which it is
based. Thus, arguably, Foucault would critique both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick57 as being equally caught in the same discursive
system in that both rely on the homosexual as a type of person."
To relate this concept to Alyson's experience, by operating within this
discursive system, Alyson has been presented with a "choice" between
heterosexual and homosexual. In the term "lesbian," her sexuality and her
identity became one; once she came out, Alyson felt "committed" to being a
lesbian.5 9 Having finally embraced the idea of herself as a lesbian, however, made
dating Jeffrey particularly difficult for Alyson 6° because such a relationship falls
outside the established binary.

53. Id. at 42-43.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of statutes criminalizing sodomy). The dissent, while characterizing the case as one about
privacy, still discussed sodomy within a binary system of gender. Id. at 196.
58. SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 263 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter eds., Abridged
ed., 2006).
59. Ryan Interview, supra note 3.
60. See id. (explaining that, had she begun to date Jeffrey prior to coming out of the closet, it would not
have been as difficult).
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B. The Problem of the Binary in NarratingGender Identity
Given any binary, it's fun to look for some hidden third, and the reason
why the third was61hidden says a lot about a culture.

-Kate Bornstein

When Alyson met Jeffrey, Jeffrey was already passing as a man:62 he had had
his breasts removed, he was taking hormones, and he had been living as a man
for about three years.63 Medical professionals, as a prerequisite for gender
reassignment surgery, encourage transgender people to live in the gender with
which they identify for a period of time prior to completing their transition, 4 By65
doing so, however, they must give up "any history beyond their current gender.,
Thus, as Bornstein argues,
The concept of passing is built into the culture's definition of
transsexuality; and the result is that transsexuals don't question the
gender system which their very existence could topple. Instead, through
the mandate of passing, the culture uses transsexuals to reinforce the
bipolar gender system, as transsexuals strive for recognition within their
new gender, and thus the privilege and chains of their new gender.66
Jeffrey, in seeking to pass as male, is invested in maintaining the gender binary,
which offers only two gender options: male or female. The very act of passing as
a male confirms his identity as male, allowing his outward appearance to
coincide with his internal gender identity. But as Bornstein notes, passing
presents a Catch-22: the very binary on which Jeffrey and other transsexuals
depend is itself dependent on their investment in, and perpetuation of, the larger
binary system of sexual discourse.

67

Such interdependence proves problematic because it fails to recognize, and
therefore maintains, the power structure inherent within the binary. As with any
binary, "it's fun to look for some 68hidden third, and the reason why the third was
hidden says a lot about a culture.,

61.

BORNSTEIN, Supra note 12, at 101.

62.

Ryan Interview, supra note 3.

63. Id.
64. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 127 (stating that transgender people are "not supposed to reveal
[their] transgender status or other-gendered past").
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. ("[Tihe culture uses transsexuals to reinforce the bipolar gender system ... .
68. Id. at 101.
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In his essay, "Anthropological Aspects of Language: Animal Categories and
Verbal Abuse," anthropologist Edmund Leach discusses his general theory of
taboo and language. 69 His theory is a useful tool in discussing any binary because
it provides a framework with which to expose cultural anxiety and suggest an
alternative. As he explains,
the physical and social environment of a young child is perceived as a
continuum. It does not contain any intrinsically separate "things." The
child, in due course, is taught to impose upon this environment a kind of
discriminating grid which serves to distinguish the world as being
composed of a large number of separate things, each labeled with a
name.... [I]t is crucially important that the basic discriminations should
be clear-cut and unambiguous. . . . But how can such certainty of
discrimination be achieved if our normal perception displays only a
continuum . . . ? [W]e have to train our perception to recognize a
discontinuous environment. We achieve this second kind of trained
perception by means of a simultaneous use of language and taboo.
Language gives us the names to distinguish the things; taboo inhibits the
recognition of those parts of the continuum which separate the things.7 °
Taboo helps us distinguish between categories of things "by suppressing our
recognition of the nonthings which fill the interstices," 7 ' thereby creating the
representation of a stable environment and a stable self in relation to that
environment. Thus, "male" and "female" appear to be the only nameable options;
taboo suppresses recognition of the other options such that someone who is
gender non-conforming is outside language, and therefore, outside recognizable
identity.
Graphically, Leach's theory can be demonstrated with a Venn diagram in
which the ambiguous overlap between the categories of p and -p 72 is taboo, and
therefore without language.7374 "[W]hatever is taboo is a focus not only of special
interest but also of anxiety.,
Leach illustrates his point by demonstrating why "the exudations of the
human body [i.e., feces, urine, semen, menstrual blood, mother's milk, etc.] are
universally the objects of intense taboo., 75 These substances are fundamentally
ambiguous because they challenge the boundaries of the human body. "The
child's first and continuing problem is to determine the initial boundary. 'What
69.

Edmund Leach, Anthropological Aspects of Language: Animal Categories and Verbal Abuse, in
34 (Eric H. Lenneberg ed., 1964).
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 36. The use of "-p" denotes that which is "not p.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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am I, as against the world?"' 76 Such substances "are both me and not me,"" thus
falling into the space between categories.

BOTH MALE
AND FEMALE,
THEREFORE TABOO

P

-p

(MALE)

(FEMALE)

Leach's example is one of identity. In the same vein, Leach's theory can be
applied to the binary between male and female. As applied, the person who falls
into both categories, into that ambiguous space, has a crisis of identity; our
language has refused to recognize that which exists between. "This world is a
representation of our language categories, not vice versa., 78 It is not that such
sex is ambiguous produces
people do not exist, but that to see such people whose
79
great anxiety, and so we pretend they do not exist.
"Language does more than provide us with a classification of things," Leach
writes, "it actually molds our environment.' '° Someone whose identity does not
fit squarely within one category or another is forced to identify with, or is
perceived as, one of the available options. Language is coercive.' If a person
cannot fit in a category (i.e., someone in transition who cannot pass as either
male or female), that person is placed in the realm of Other.82

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 34.
79. See id. at 35 (suggesting that those unnamed things that share characteristics of named things are
outside trained perception).
80. Id. at 36.
81. See id. (suggesting language "molds our environment").
82. The term "Other" is one commonly used in postmodern terminology as "the ultimate signifier of
everyone the subject is not, as well as everything the subject does not have. For Jacques Lacan, the discovery of
the Other parallels the acquisition of the abilities to speak and to distinguish between I and you, which are
tantamount to the acquisition of social identity." THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF MODERN LITERARY AND
CULTURAL CRITICISM 216 (Joseph Childers & Gary Hentzi eds., 1995). The "Other," then, is used to
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It is not that we do not acknowledge that such people exist, but rather it is
how we choose to acknowledge their existence within the zones of invisibility we
have created by our use of language and taboo. Because such people (e.g.,
transsexuals, homosexuals, and intersex 3 people) defy the established order of
the binaries of sex, gender, and sexuality, some people view them as Other, often
labeling them as diseased.84 According to Foucault, "we may be prepared to
admit that a 'passive' man, a 'virile' woman, people of the same sex who love
one another, do not seriously impair the established order; but we are ready
enough to believe that there is something like an 'error' involved in what they
do."85 Applying Leach's theory, so-called deviant sexuality is taboo.86
Bringing both Leach's and Foucault's ideas together, then, demonstrates that
to break down the self-maintaining power structure inherent in the gender binary,
that which is taboo (here, someone who is neither male nor female, but both)
must be named and recognized. Doing so exposes the inadequacy of the gender
binary to account for the reality of people's identity.
Looking further into Jeffrey's situation, for example, demonstrates one such
situation that threatens the seemingly clean binary by illustrating the inadequacy
of the choices within the binary-if Jeffrey still has a vagina,87 is he more
"properly" labeled male or female?"
The question is not so easily answered, despite the notion that the
identification of men and women is easy. 9 For most people, perhaps the answer
is self-evident. However, as Kate Bornstein suggests, "We're so sure of our
ability to categorize people as either men or women that we neglect to ask
ourselves some very basic questions: what is a man? and what is a woman? and

differentiate one's identity from that which it is not.
83. See Definitions, supra note 10 (defining intersex people as "individuals who are born with some
male and some female sexual characteristics, particularly an anomaly of the external genitalia or internal
reproductive organs").
84. Homosexuality was considered a psychological disease until 1973 when it was dropped from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Second Edition. SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW,
supra note 58, at 11. To go through transition, transsexuals must be diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder.
See generally BUTLER, supra note 12, at 75-101. See also ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY:
GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 80 (2000) (stating that the "social imperative" to

achieve a two-sex system by performing infant genital surgery "is so strong that doctors have come to accept it
as a medical imperative, despite strong evidence that early genital surgery doesn't work: it causes extensive
scarring, requires multiple surgeries, and often obliterates the possibility of orgasm").

'85. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HERCULINE BARBIN: BEING THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED MEMOIRS OF A
NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH HERMAPHRODITE x (Richard McDougall trans., 1980).
86. See Leach, supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing language and taboo).
87. Ryan Interview, supra note 3.
88. It is important to note that the question itself makes sense as a question only because a vagina is read
as a female attribute and therefore is "improper" for a male to possess. The same question could not be asked if
we were pointing to a genderless attribute, such as blue eyes.
89. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223 (1999) (suggesting that children can confidently make the
distinction between a man and a woman, particularly if the person is without clothes).
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why do we need to be one or the other?"9 For a great number of people born
transgender or intersex, that determination is not so evident; furthermore, because
of the state of the American legal system, the determination is crucial. 9'
The determination, codified in the law, likely has real consequences outside
of the legal context as well. It affects our understanding of such a seemingly
basic thing as our identity. 92 For instance, the characteristics by which sex and
gender are defined and vice versa problematize the difference in Alyson's and
Jeffrey's definitions and labels for themselves. To be precise, the categories of
man and woman, and hence, relationally, the labels heterosexual and
homosexual, are reciprocally related to the attributes that culturally define them.
If sex is defined by one's sex organs, then Alyson and Jeffrey are lesbians,
assuming that one's desire, and therefore orientation, is defined by the particular
sex organ of the partner. But there are many factors other than sex organs by
which one's sex can be defined.93
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE BINARY IN LEGAL DISCOURSE ABOUT
SEXUAL AND GENDER IDENTITY

Because the law places such emphasis on gender within the area of marriage,
defining gender becomes important. One option would be to define gender by
chromosomes: XX would equal woman, XY man. Indeed, an English case,
Corbett v. Corbett, looked to chromosomal, gonadal, and genital indicators.94 The
congruence of the three indicators determined the sex of the person for purposes
of marriage. 9 There are several problems with such a test, however. The first is
that most people do not have their chromosomes checked. In fact, production of a
chromosome test is not a requirement for a marriage license.96 Furthermore,
"commonly-occurring sets of gender chromosomes, including XXY, XXX,
YYY, XYY, and XO," mean that more than two genders might exist. 97 Courts
that rely on chromosomal factors fail to address how to identify what someone's
chromosomal sex is or what to do in the case of intersex people.98

90. BORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 55.
91. Sex, as a designation, appears on most, if not all, legal forms, including, but not limited to, birth
certificates, death certificates, and marriage licenses. One's sex determines who one may marry as well as
which bathroom one should use without the risk of criminal citations.
92. That is, if the cultural use of language already limits the ways in which identity is expressed and/or
recognized, to codify it in law further limits and problematizes identity.
93. See infra Part 11l.
94. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306 (P.D.A. 1970) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
95. Id.
96. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2006) (holding that a chromosomal test is not required a for
marriage to be valid).
97. BORNSTEIN, supranote 12, at 56.
98. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223 (1999) (holding a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be male for marital purposes based on chromosomal factors).
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Another possible factor to consider for defining gender might be the presence of
particular hormones, such as estrogen and testosterone. 99 However, if hormones alone
are a determining factor of gender, gender can be bought over-the-counter.' °°
Moreover, the varying degree of hormonal presence between people suggests
varying degrees of gender, a notion that defies the binary system"'
The law's attempt at defining gender, as discussed in further detail below, proves
inadequate as well. Kate Bornstein's observation says it well; she writes, "I'll be the
one the dictionary has trouble naming."'' 0 2 The problem is illustrated in Black's Law
Dictionary where "man" is defined as "1. An adult male. 2. Humankind."'' 3 The
dictionary, however, lacks definitions for both "woman" and "gender. '' °
Interestingly enough, the dictionary does provide a definition for "sex," albeit one
that perhaps creates more ambiguity: "sex," according to Black's Law Dictionary,is
"[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female organism."'0 5
A.

The Problem of the Binary in a Clash of NarrativesAbout Sexual and
Gender Identity

Because of the inability to define clearly Jeffrey's gender by any consistent
factors, labels such as homosexual and heterosexual seem to be fluid as well. The
relationship between Alyson and Jeffrey demonstrates this.
Just as Jeffrey bought into the gender binary, Alyson invested in the sexuality
binary, which recognizes just two sexual orientations: heterosexual and
homosexual. "6 As a result, Alyson's and Jeffrey's understanding of their identities
for each other. Jeffrey wanted Alyson to think of him as
clashed with their' 0attraction
"any other guy.' 7 Alyson, though, felt that as a lesbian, she could not do that
because if Jeffrey were just "any other guy," she would not have been dating him.""5
Alyson was hesitant, then; to call Jeffrey her boyfriend because she felt as if no one
would take her seriously as a lesbian if she had a boyfriend.5 9
99. For a discussion on gender as defined by sex hormones, see FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 84, at
170-94.
100. BORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 56.
101. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 84, at 183 (discussing the presence of testosterone and estrogen
in both men and women such that scientists cannot define hormones as either male or female by virtue of their
unique presence in a male or female body).
102. Id. at 238.
103.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (7th ed. 1999).

104. See id. at 891, 1598 (lacking definitions for "woman" and "gender").
105. Id. at 1379.
106. Even a view of sexuality that recognizes bisexuality refuses to recognize the nuances of sexuality
that fall between the labels of heterosexual, bisexual, and homosexual. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 35-38
(positing other variants on which sexual preference could be based other than the gender of one's partner).
107. Ryan Interview, supra note 3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Thus, dating Jeffrey made Alyson revisit the label she once chose, a label
that became even more inadequate. To Alyson, Jeffrey was a guy, but not "any
other guy";" ° Jeffrey is a man with a vagina."' While generally viewing Jeffrey
as male would not be a conflict, she did not consider a vagina a male sex organ."'
Because she understood the vagina to be a female sex organ, to Alyson, sex with
Jeffrey was akin to lesbian sex.' Jeffrey, on the other hand, thought of sex with
Alyson as heterosexual sex'"4 because it was sex between a male and a female,
thereby revealing that he does not define his gender identity merely in terms of
his sex organs.
B. Decoupling the Binary: Toward an Open-Ended Discourse of Sexual and
Gender Identity
yes, i remember,
"i keep thinking i have to be something,
ihave to have a definition."
so was i looking for something in particular,
orjust to eliminate those boundaries?
was it a sex i wanted?
did it even have to do with sex?
iopened that door,
the one i was so afraidof
the one i was pushed up against.
it's the freedom i was missing,
the liberty to define myself as I wanted.
it wasn't a sex on the other side of the door,
it was just me.
-desiree ellen"5
A woman in a relationship with a transgender man during his transition said
that the act of sex itself did not change, but that labels and words used to describe
the act changed to accommodate the way her partner now identifies. ' 6 Now,
rather than calling her partner's sexual organ a vagina, they have no word for that
orifice.' 7 In her view, the label is not important."' They have given up on finding

110.
Jeffrey was
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
Review).
117.

586

Id. (stating that, to her, unless society starts redefining sex organs such that a vagina can be male,
a man with a vagina).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
desiree ellen, like a dervish, 2001 (unpublished poem, on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Telephone interview with Anonymous (Nov. 15, 2005) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law
Id.
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such words; it does not matter, she said, if you can explain it to someone else's
satisfaction." 9
What this example suggests is that there is an alternative to the prevailing
binaries. That is, language allows for more options, such as a recognition of one's
gender identity, but even our language does not account for the multitude of
situations that arise in real life. Take, for instance, Kate Bornstein, "a transsexual
lesbian whose female lover is becoming a man."' 2 When her lover becomes a
man, is Bornstein still a lesbian? Was she a lesbian before her own transition? Do
these labels even matter? This provides a prime example of the problem of not
being able to put into language that which is real to one's experience. The orifice
is unnamable because within our current language, any name for this orifice is
already gendered. To recognize a vagina as a male organ outside of gendered
language is not yet possible; for those who view gender as a binary, the
ungendered word does not, and cannot, exist. Such a word is taboo. As argued
earlier, naming that which is taboo in ungendered language is perhaps the first
step in breaking down the gender binaries.' 2 ' Bornstein crystallizes this when she
explains,
I know I'm not a man-about that much I'm very clear, and I've come to
the conclusion that I'm probably not a woman either, at least not
according to a lot of people's rules on this sort of thing. The trouble is,
we're living in a world that insists we be one or the other-a world that
doesn't bother to tell us exactly what one or the other is.2
As Alyson and Jeffrey's problem illustrates, the ramifications of such a
"world that insists we be one [sex] or the other ' ' 23 are real. One woman in a
relationship with a transgender man commented, "I have been with him since
before he transitioned, so I have experience with my identity making his invisible
before he transitioned. And now that he passes, I am no long [sic] read as dyke,
making my identity invisible.' 2 4 The binary system limits the expression of one's
identity by rigidly offering two options, rendering all others invisible.
In many situations, perhaps these labels do not matter. Perhaps it is not
important to name the sexual organs of one's partner. Perhaps identity should not
be dependent on such fluid factors. If labels and naming persist, however, at the
very least, people's lives should not be regulated according to them. That is, the

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. BORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 3.
121. See supradiscussion following note 86 in text.
122. BORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 8.
123. Id.
124. E-mail from Anonymous, to Jennifer M. Protas (Nov. 14, 2005, 07:34 PST) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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law should cease to regulate lives in areas as important as marriage based on such
fluid and inadequate categories as gender and sexual orientation.
C. The Dangerof Embracing the Binary: JudicialDiscourseAbout Sexual
Identity
The jurisprudence of gender has been bound with that of sexuality.
Therefore, initially looking at the way the law construes sexuality will facilitate a
better understanding of the trajectory the law is taking in transgender cases and
illuminate the language problem posited in this Comment. In both the
jurisprudence of gender and sexuality, a binary is assumed (heterosexual/
homosexual, male/female).'25 This binary narrative 26 within these cases posits a
hierarchy such that heterosexuality stands above homosexuality. This hierarchy,
in the Foucauldian sense, seeks to maintain itself by insisting on the difference
between heterosexuality and homosexuality and hence retains power in the
narrative of heterosexuality over homosexuality. To provide equal treatment to
homosexuals and heterosexuals would be to recognize the fallacy of this
hierarchy, that is, the fallacy of the difference between the two for purposes of
legal categorization, and thus collapse the power relations between the two.
The cases discussed below reveal this self-perpetuating hierarchy; by
invoking the notion of the difference between heterosexuality and homosexuality
for purposes of legal categorization, heterosexuality remains the norm and
homosexuality is still placed in the realm of Other.127 Only by attacking the
premise on which these narratives depend do the results begin to shift, as the
2
judicial language in more recent cases demonstrates.1 1
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick129 and
upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing consensual sodomy.130 The result in the
125. See supra, note 106 (suggesting that the existence of bisexuality does not change the notion that the
labels of heterosexual, bisexual, and homosexual fail to account for all forms of sexuality).
126. Narratives come in various forms and cross various boundaries:
[Ulnder this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every place, in
every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has been a people
without narrative. All classes, all human groups, have their narratives, enjoyment of which is very
often shared by men with different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds. Caring nothing for the
division between good and bad literature, narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is
simply there, like life itself.
Roland Barthes, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in A BARTHES READER 251-52 (Susan
Sontag ed. 1982).
127. See supra note 82 (defining "Other").
128. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996);
Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
129. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
130. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (7th ed. 1999) ("[Defining] sodomy [as] 1. Oral or anal
copulation between humans, esp. those of the same sex. 2. Oral or anal copulation between a human and an
animal; bestiality. - Also termed buggery; crime against nature; abominable and detestable crime against
nature; unnaturaloffense' unspeakable crime; (archaically) sodomitry.").
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case, as framed by Justice White, is almost indisputable, unless the basic premise,
that is, White's framing of the issue, is confronted. 3 '
Michael Hardwick was charged with violating Georgia's statute criminalizing sodomy when he was found in his bedroom engaging in "that act with
another adult male.' 32 The statute, which White relegated to a footnote, 33 applied
to both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy; it read, in pertinent part, "[a]
person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act3' 4 involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another."'

White, however, framed the issue in terms of homosexual sodomy, as well as
in terms of a specific question about constitutional protection for a single
behavior-a high threshold indeed. He wrote,
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against sodomy
between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in
particular, are wise or desirable. It raises no question about the right or
propriety of state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that
criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating
those laws on state constitutional grounds. The issue presented is
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time.'35
By framing the issue in this way, White made the case one about the difference
between heterosexuality and homosexuality, while members of both orientations
perform the acts the statute criminalized equally. It is interesting to note that, in
conjunction with White's framing of the issue, the district court refused to grant a
heterosexual couple standing in the case because they were not "in immediate36
danger of sustaining[] any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute.'
Hardwick, however, was granted standing,' 37 thus demonstrating the court's view

131.

See Gregory C. Pingree, Rhetorical Holy War: Polygamy, Homosexuality, and the Paradox of

Community and Autonomy, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 313, 369-73 (2006) (discussing the moral

syllogism within Bowers v. Hardwick).
132. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
133. See infra text accompanying note 136 (noting that a heterosexual couple was denied standing
because, though the statute was technically neutral, a heterosexual couple was not in danger of sustaining a
direct injury).
134. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
135. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 188.
137. Id. Though the charges against Hardwick were dropped, he brought the case, asserting "that he was
a practicing homosexual, that the Georgia sodomy statute, as administered by the defendants, placed him in
imminent danger of arrest, and that the statute for several reasons violates the Federal Constitution." Id.

589
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that the statute was being discriminatorily enforced against homosexuals despite
its neutral language.
By reducing the case to one about homosexual sodomy, the result is
predictable, if not obvious. 3 ' White took the definition of a fundamental right to
be "those liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."1 39 Citing to the history of criminalizing sodomy, he concluded that "to
claim that a right to engage in [sodomy] is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best,
facetious.
If one buys White's basic premise, the result follows quickly. The legitimacy
of White's argument depends on the difference between heterosexual and
homosexual sodomy. The argument, however, is not unassailable. 4' Indeed, both
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers and Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in
Lawrence v. Texas 42 framed the issue differently such that the result in Bowers
could not stand.
Blackmun framed the issue as "the right to be let alone"'43 and described the
statute as one that "denies individuals the right to decide for themselves whether
to engage in particular forms of private, consensual sexual activity. '"' This
language makes the issue one about personal choice and autonomy in terms of
both homosexual and heterosexual conduct. It is about "private, consensual
sexual activity.' 45
Similarly, Kennedy appealed to notions of privacy and autonomy: "Liberty
protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or
other private places.... Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions.' 46 By reframing the issue in terms of privacy, as well as attacking
the historical premises on which Bowers relied, 47 Kennedy concluded that
"Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought

138. Id. at 192 ("It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations [of what rights qualify for
heightened protection] would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals engaged in acts of consensual
sodomy.").
139. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
140. Id. at 194.
141. See Pingree, supra note 131.
142. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers).
143. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
147. Id. at 568-69 ("[E]arly American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but
instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally. This does not suggest approval of
homosexual conduct. It does tend to show that this particular form of conduct was not thought of as a separate
category from like conduct between heterosexual persons.") (emphasis added).
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not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled."''4 8 As a case "about" privacy rather than homosexual sodomy,
Kennedy stripped the power of sexual difference so that the decision no longer
turned on an anxiety to perpetuate the power structure inherent in the
heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy (which he noted imposes a stigma on
homosexual persons) 4 9 but rather on a liberty interest in which all people have a
stake.
While Lawrence made progress in exposing the lack of difference for
purposes of legal categories in terms of sodomy, the law still distinguishes
between opposite-sex and same-sex relationships in the context of marriage.
Seven years after Bowers was decided, three same-sex couples sued the state
of Hawaii for marriage licenses in Baehr v. Lewin ° The case worked its way
through the state system, and, in 1993, the Hawaiian Supreme Court entered a
judgment granting the plaintiffs' request for an injunction.'
In response to the fear Baehr v. Lewin raised that same-sex unions might be52
recognized, Congress passed the so-called Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
The stated purpose of the act is two-fold. First, "to defend the institution of
traditional heterosexual marriage."' 53 Second, to protect the states' right to have a
public policy in opposition to the legal recognition of same-sex unions of any
sort.

154

DOMA was prompted by the fear that two people of the same sex might be
permitted to marry. 55 Such a marriage would challenge the nation's history of
recognizing only heterosexual marriage. 56 Long before the first same-sex
marriage was given legal recognition in any state,' 57 Congress made it clear that a
148. Id. at 578.
149. See id. at 575 ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
and in the private spheres.... [Bowers'] continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial.").
150. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
151. Id.
152. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended as 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
153. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 (1996).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 2 ("[T]he state courts in Hawaii appear to be on the verge of requiring that State to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The prospect of permitting homosexual couples to "marry" in Hawaii
threatens to have very real consequences both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage laws) of
the various States.").
156. See id. at 3 ("No State now or at any time in American history has permitted same-sex couples to
enter into the institution of marriage.").
157. See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage/RelationshipRecognition, available at http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Center&Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=63&COntentlD=17
353#extlinks (last visited Nov. 17, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (demonstrating that
currently, eight states recognize some form of same-sex unions). Only Massachusetts recognizes same-sex
marriages. Vermont and Connecticut recognize civil unions. Hawaii has established reciprocal beneficiaries.
California, the District of Columbia, Maine, and New Jersey provide some sort of domestic partnership registry.
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public policy against such unions was both expected and reasonable. 5 Without
DOMA, it easily could become a reality that a same-sex union in one state would
have to be recognized in another. 59
In the aftermath of DOMA, several states have passed mini-DOMA's as well
as constitutional amendments (re)defining marriage as a union between a man
and a woman.' 6° In Texas, for example, "[a] license may not be issued for the
marriage of persons of the same sex.'' Similarly, in California, "[o]nly marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized ....
While in most states only unions between people of the same sex are legally
proscribed, as opposed to unions between homosexuals, 63 such unions have been64
put in direct contrast to "the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,"'
thus demonstrating the underlying anxiety with the recognition of unions
between people who are not heterosexual. The statutes draw distinctions between
the relationships between heterosexual and homosexual people.' 65 Moreover, the
statutes draw lines based on gender by regulating one's marriage choice on the
basis of the gender of the two parties.
However, formulating marriage in terms of such distinctions, which the law
assumes, and perhaps insists, are stable and immutable, necessarily invites their
own destruction; the situation in which a transgender person attempts to marry
another person, whether transgender or not, demonstrates the inadequacy of the
current state of the law in dealing with these issues. 66 Whether a union is
characterized as a same-sex union depends necessarily on the ways in which the
legal system defines a person's gender. This proves problematic for a variety of
The rights, responsibilities, and privileges that come with each of these varies between states. No same-sex
unions are recognized by the federal government. Id.
158. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 ("[The second purpose of DOMA is] to protect the right of the States
to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex unions, free from any federal
constitutional implications that might attend the recognition by one State of the right for homosexual couples to
acquire marriage licenses.").
159. See id. ("[I]f Hawaii (or some other State) recognizes same-sex 'marriages,' other States that do not
permit homosexuals to marry would be confronted with the complicated issue of whether they are nonetheless
obligated under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution to give binding legal effect to
such unions.").
160. See Human Rights Campaign, supra note 157 (demonstrating that currently, only New York
explicitly honors marriages of same-sex couples performed in other jurisdictions). Only a handful of
jurisdictions (the District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode Island) have no
explicit prohibition against honoring such marriages. Id.
161. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (Vernon 2006).
162. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2006).
163. DOMA does not prohibit homosexuals from getting married per se. A lesbian is permitted to marry
a man, just as a gay man is permitted to marry a woman. The Act even allows a gay man to marry a lesbian. The
Act discriminates by placing restrictions on the gender of the person one can marry, and in that sense, is gender
discrimination.
164. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996) (stating that the first purpose of the Act is "to defend the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage").
165. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
166. See infra Part III.D for a discussion on the inadequacy of the law dealing with transgender rights.
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reasons. As demonstrated below, the existence of transgender people questions
the stability of gender, thus threatening to collapse the dichotomy of sexual
difference on which these laws stand to reveal, ultimately, the similarities
between a range of genders and sexualities.
D. The Dangerof Embracing the Binary: JudicialDiscourseAbout Gender
Identity
i could prove to you
-fact evidence debate rebuttalthat i am one thing
switch spots
so i can prove to you
(same process as before)
that i am the exact opposite
you'll move on
forget every me
because i couldn't decide on one
'
-desiree ellen 68
To return to the original problem Alyson and Jeffrey faced, this Comment
will now turn to an examination of the jurisprudence surrounding transgender
marriage cases. It is important to note first, however, that the issues that the gay
community faces are not necessarily the same that the transgender community
70
faces. 169 Similarly, a transgender person is not necessarily homosexual.1
However, similarities exist between the arguments used by and against both
groups.17 ' Furthermore, decisions adversely affecting one group often have an
adverse affect for the other. This is particularly true in the fight for marriage
equality, in part because the courts have conflated the issues. That is, under
existing laws, whether a transsexual may marry depends wholly on a court's
interpretive stance on gender. When courts have refused to recognize a person's
gender identity, they have in turn refused to recognize that person's marriage to a

167. See generally Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, supra note 15 (looking at the constitutional
implications that arise depending on how a person's legal sex is defined).
168. desiree ellen, every me, Nov. 8, 2000 (unpublished poem, on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
169. Sexual orientation is about sexual desire toward a particular object choice, whereas transgender is
about one's own sense of gender identity.
170. For example, a female-to-male transsexual may desire a female, and thus self-identify as
heterosexual.
171. See, e.g., In re Coordination Proceeding, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Mar. 14, 2005) (stating that
marriage laws limiting marriage to a union between one man and one woman discriminate on the basis of
gender). "If a person, male or female, wishes to marry, then he or she may do so as long as the intended spouse
is of a different gender. It is the gender of the intended spouse that is the sole determining factor." Id. at 8.
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member of the opposite sex'72 on the ground that such a marriage constitutes a
same-sex marriage.'73 These issues, transgender marriage and same-sex marriage,
then, have been merged.
Consequently, so long as marriage is not gender neutral, success for one
community raises the same anxieties as the other. That is, to recognize one
marriage begs the question of the other; if a court recognizes marriage for
transgender couples, while simultaneously excluding marriage for same-sex
couples, arguably, the differentiation between the two is called into question.
Recognition of either also threatens the hierarchy of categories that the law and
its proponents seek to maintain merely by questioning the power differentiation
and classification based on gender.
Unlike sexuality, however, the notion that gender is anything other than an
immutably binary system is arguably newer and threatens something most people
consider to be closer to their core identity. Thus, the resistance against the
recognition that someone's gender identity is incongruous with her biological sex
is arguably stronger. Seen in this way, it is not surprising that all but one of the
few transgender marriage cases have rejected recognition of gender identity for
purposes of marriage.
For example, in 1987, a probate court in Ohio was faced with the question
"whether a post-operative male to female transsexual is permitted under Ohio
law to marry a male.' 74 The court restated the issue, however, as "whether two
individuals, biologically and legally of the same sex at birth, may contract to
marry each other. ' ' 75 Restated as such, the question suggests the answer; the
question has already determined that a person's sex for purposes of the law is to
be the same as the person's biological sex. 176 It follows, therefore, that if samesex marriage is prohibited, as can be inferred from the statement of the issue, the
marriage will be invalid.
Under this Ohio case then, Jeffrey would be considered a female because he
was born with a vagina. Hence, it follows that Jeffrey would be prohibited from
marrying Alyson, even though he presents himself as a male and self-identifies as
male, because according to the court, that would be a same-sex marriage.
However, by the same logic, Jeffrey would be permitted to marry a man.
The Ladrach court even rejected an attempt at a legal sex change. 77 After
Ladrach's application for a marriage license was rejected on the basis that "[her]
birth certificate still showed [her] to be a male person and that Ohio law did not

172. Opposite, that is, from the gender identity of the person in question.
173. See generally In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6 (1987);
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
174. Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d at 6.
175. Id.
176. Id. (equating one's biological and legal sex in the statement "biologically and legally of the same
sex," thus leaving no room to differ).
177. Id. at 7.
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permit persons of the same gender to marry,"'78 she "filed an application for
correction of [her] birth record, stating that Item 4 which reads 'Boy' should read
'Girl.""' 7 9 Rather than recognizing the change on the birth certificate, the court
found that the statute permitting changes to a birth certificate is "strictly a
'correction' type statute," allowing changes only to correct errors on the original
entry. '80 The court held that there was no error on the birth certificate designating
Ladrach a "boy" in the "sex" category.181
The court, having concluded that Ladrach was born a male and would always
legally be a male, refused to recognize her marriage to a male.8 2 The court failed
to recognize that gender can be defined by anything other than the outward
expression of genitals at birth.'83 Such a view does not account for intersex
children born with ambiguous genitalia. Perhaps more importantly, the court's
view suggests that gender is binaristic. Its insistence that one's genitals at birth
determines gender reinforces the binary, codifying it in law.
A similar decision was reached in Littleton v. Prange in Texas, but this time
with language that was deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian narrative. 84 Littleton
was a wrongful death action brought by Christie Lee Littleton.'85 The issue, as
framed by Judge Hardberger,
[i]nvolves the most basic of questions. When is a man a man, and when
is a woman a woman? Every schoolchild, even of tender years, is
confident he or she can tell the difference, especially if the person is
wearing no clothes. These are observations that each of us makes early in
life and, in most cases, continue to have more than a passing interest in
for the rest of our lives. It is one of the more pleasant mysteries.
The deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a physician
change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling,
or is
6
a person's gender immutablyfixed by our Creatorat birth?
As Hardberger's language demonstrates, this decision is firmly situated in the
jurisprudence of natural law. Anything a physician can do "with a scalpel, drugs
and counseling" merely produces a person "born as a man, but surgically altered
to have the physical characteristics of a woman."'1 7 The court thus determined

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 10.
See id. (failing to recognize the various other possible factors on which to define gender).
9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added).
Id. at 224-25.
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that Littleton was biologically still a male.'88 While recognizing that some
physicians would consider Littleton female, the court concluded that "[h]er
female anatomy, however, is all man-made. The body that Christie inhabits is a
male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied."'' 9
The court did acknowledge that "there are many fine metaphysical arguments
lurking about here involving desire and being, the essence of life and the power
of mind over physics," '90 but dismissed such things as "too far into the misty
fields of sociological philosophy,"' 9' and thus outside the scope of where courts
should wander.
The language of this opinion demonstrates a sympathy for Littleton's
situation. The court looked to the medical testimony and acknowledged that
Littleton is not a transvestite but a transsexual. 92 More importantly, the court
noted that "a transsexual is not a homosexual in the traditional sense of the word,
in that transsexuals believe and feel they are members of the opposite sex."' 93
What the court refused to recognize, however, is Christie's gender identity for
purposes of her cultural and legal life. Hardberger ultimately stated, "There are
some things we cannot will into being. They just are.' 94
The court's opinion, rooted so deeply in notions of natural law and God's
creation, refused even to acknowledge the binary between male and female as a
social construct. 9' As written, the view is non-negotiable. It is situated in the
realm of faith such that an appeal to any other value or belief will surely fail. The
law should be outside faith and protect equal freedoms for everyone.'96
A court's view that gender identity, rather than God, defines gender would
lead to the conclusion that Christie is female, regardless of whether a doctor
performed gender reassignment surgery.197 Characterized as such, a physician is
not "chang[ing] the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling,"'' 9
but rather reconciling one's gender with the body culturally associated with that
gender.
Only one case at the appellate level has recognized a person's gender identity
for purposes of marriage. In 1976, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate

188. Id. at 231.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 230.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 231.
195. See id. at 223-24 (implying gender is "immutably fixed by our Creator at birth").
196. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (discussing the constitutional requirements of
the separation of church and state).
197. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 223-24 (asking if "a person's gender [is] immutably fixed by our Creator
at birth").
198. Id.
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Division decided M.T. v. J.T. 99 The case began as a complaint for support and
maintenance at divorce, but the defendant J.T. raised the defense that M.T. was a
male and that the marriage was therefore void.2°° The issue facing the court was
"whether the marriage between a male and a postoperative transsexual, who has
surgically changed her external sexual anatomy from male to female, is to be
regarded as a lawful marriage between a man and a woman." ''
In distinguishing its decision from that of the English case Corbett v.
Corbett,°2 the M.T. court found that "there are several criteria or standards which
may be relevant in determining the sex of an individual. 2 3 Ultimately, however,
the court's decision seems to rest on the testimony that, after her surgery, M.T.
"had a vagina and labia which were 'adequate for sexual intercourse' and could
function as any female vagina, that is, for 'traditional penile/vaginal
intercourse.""' Indeed, the court noted,

Implicit in the reasoning underpinning our determination is the tacit but
valid assumption of the lower court and the experts upon whom reliance
was placed that for purposes of marriage under the circumstances of this
case, it is the sexual capacity of the individual which must be scrutinized.
Sexual capacity or sexuality in this frame of reference requires the
coalescence of both the physical ability and the psychological and
emotional orientation to engage in sexual intercourse as either a male or
a female. °5
Thus, while acknowledging M.T.'s gender identity, her marriage is recognized as
valid only if she is physically capable of penile-vaginal intercourse and has a
heterosexual orientation. The decision, then, still operates within the gender
binary, and thus, still perpetuates the notion of gender as two discrete categories.
This decision excludes from marriage those transgender people who cannot
or do not have the surgery to change their genitals from male to female genitals
or vice versa because such people are then incapable of penile-vaginal sex, as the
court defines it, even if they are the opposite sex of their partner. This
disproportionately affects female-to-male transsexuals, in part, because the
construction of a fully functioning penis has yet to be perfected.2 ° Furthermore,
the decision discriminates against those transgender individuals who, after
transitioning, do not have what is considered a "heterosexual" orientation. Thus,

199. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
200. Id. at 205.
201. Id. at 208.
202. [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306 (P.D. 1970).
203. 355 A.2d at 208.
204. Id. at 206.
205. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
206. See Rachlin, supra note 11 (stating that many female-to-male transsexuals do not have a
phalloplasty because of flaws in the technology).
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when a female-to-male transsexual who, as a female, was considered
heterosexual, transitions to a male, he is considered gay, and is no longer
permitted to marry the same person with whom he was in love prior to
transitioning. Such line drawing is demonstrably arbitrary.
Though this case is often celebrated for its outcome, its result still proves
inadequate for several situations, including that of Alyson and Jeffrey. As a
female-to-male transsexual who did not undergo a phalloplasty,207 Jeffrey would
be incapable of penile-vaginal intercourse with Alyson despite his "psychological
20 8
and emotional orientation to engage in sexual intercourse as . . .a male.,
However, before his transition, Jeffrey would still be prohibited from marrying
Alyson because their relationship would be a lesbian relationship. Thus, even
with what is arguably the most progressive decision for transgender equality in
the context of marriage, Jeffrey would still be prohibited from marrying Alyson
had he so desired. Such injustice is the result of courts' insistence on justifying
their decisions on the basis of gendered lines. Only by operating outside this
gender discourse will equality be found.
E. Toward GreaterCandorand Nuance in Judicial DiscourseAbout Sexual and
GenderIdentity
The problem of the binary is manifested in judicial opinions such that legal
discourse perpetuates the discriminatory system, perhaps even blindly. This
Comment has spent a significant amount of time demonstrating and exposing the
binary problem and the inequality that results from a system caught in such a
coercive linguistic paradigm. To propose a simple solution to this problem,
however, would be to ignore the complexity of the problem; indeed, a simple
solution is not possible. Acknowledging the difficulty, this Comment suggests a
first step-a move toward a more sophisticated, nuanced mode of candid thought
and honesty in legal discourse.
To be sure, the battle for marriage is ultimately a battle about the narrative
and meaning of marriage. As demonstrated by the foregoing analysis of judicial
opinions regarding marriage, much is at stake in the chosen narrative. However,
without candor in the opinions about the narrative being told, there can be no
traction in discourse; only with a clear understanding of what the opinion is
really after can we begin to see where the narrative is really moving.
Philosopher Honi Fern Haber discusses the notion that all narratives come
from a perspective; no narrative is wholly objective:
There is no view from nowhere. We can never leave all our prejudices
behind and operate from a wholly disinterested standpoint, but our
prejudices become dangerous only when they are dogmatic, kept hidden
207.
208.

See id. (defining phalloplasty).
M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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from view and not open to discussion ....

We cannot think or speak,

much less act, in any purposeful manner without having structured our
world and our interests in some heuristically useful way. Without some
notion of structure (unity) and some allowance for a legitimate
recognition of similarities between ourselves and others, there can be no
subject, community, language, culture.2 9
As Haber suggests, it is impossible to stand outside of narrative. However, it is
simultaneously important to recognize and lay bare the prejudices from which
one operates in order that there be some form of recognition of the similarities,
and therefore, differences, between the standpoints of speakers. Then, and only
then, can meaningful discourse take place. It is not that we can ever escape the
prejudices inherent in the medium of discourse, but that to be principled in the
argument makes for a more open discussion such that a meaningful compromise
is at least possible.
Narratives that attack the narrative process of others by taking a
fundamentalist approach, rather than a principled, candid approach to narration,
risk shutting off discourse rather than providing a space for meaningful
discussion toward a possible solution. To demonstrate, consider two judicial
opinions in their approach to the issue of marriage equality. The first is from
Judge Skillman's 2005 opinion in Lewis v. Harris.2'° The other is from Justice
Marshall's 2003 majority opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health.'
In Lewis v. Harris, the issue before the court was "whether the New Jersey
Constitution compels the State to allow same-sex couples to marry."2 2 In
addressing the issue, the court took a fundamentalist approach, suggesting that
marriage is and has always been between people of the opposite sex, and
therefore, should remain so. The court wrote,
The right to marry has always been understood in law and tradition to
apply only to couples of different genders. A change in that basic
understanding would not lift a restriction on the right, but would work a
fundamental transformation of marriage into an arrangement that could
never have been within the intent of the Framers of the 1947
Constitution. Significantly, such a change would contradict the
established and universally accepted legal precept that marriage is the
union of people of different genders.2 3
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210.
211.
212.
213.

HONI FERN HABER, BEYOND POSTMODERN POLITICS: LYOTARD, RORTY, FOUCAULT 1, 5 (1994).

875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
875 A.2d at 262.
Id. at 263.
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The opinion, framed in this way, rested on the premise that marriage is available
only to opposite-sex couples because it has always been that way. To be sure, it
suggested that the concept is both "established and universally accepted."'2 14 To
change that, the opinion suggested, would be to fundamentally alter marriage to
be something other than what the Framers intended." 5 Missing from this decision
was a discussion of the competing argument for the narrative of marriage, one
that perhaps could reconcile the historical tradition of marriage with the notion of
marriage equality for all. Instead, the decision removed the possibility of any
opposition, and thus any meaningful discussion,
by suggesting that such
216
precepts.
legal
all
of
face
the
in
flies
opposition
Contrast such language with the opening of Justice Marshall's opinion in
Goodridge:
Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive commitment of two
individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; it brings
stability to our society. For those who choose to marry, and for their
children, marriage provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social
benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal, financial, and social
obligations. The question before us is whether, consistent with the
Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the
protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two
individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.217
Here, Marshall began by invoking the traditional and ideological marriage
narrative.2 8 In doing so, Marshall engaged most readers in a narrative that
encompassed the traditional values sought to be protected and upheld by any
marriage narrative, regardless of which side of the debate such readers
advocate.219
From there, the opinion, having engaged both sides of the debate, took a step
further, explicitly characterizing the opposing views in a parallel form, both
carefully and respectfully, and proposing, in the end, a judicial purpose on which
both sides arguably would agree:
Many people hold deep-seated
that marriage should be limited
and that homosexual conduct
religious, moral, and ethical
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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religious, moral, and ethical convictions
to the union of one man and one woman,
is immoral. Many hold equally strong
convictions that same-sex couples are

Id.
Id.
See id.
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
See id. (discussing the "exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other").
Id.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
entitled to be married, and that homosexual persons should be treated no
differently than their heterosexual neighbors .... "Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."22
The narrative goal expounded in the last sentence offers to moderate between the
two opposing views to suggest a principled foundation from which courts should
221
seek to decide cases. In essence, the narrative of "liberty of all" calls upon
courts to transcend their concrete differences in favor of more candid, nuanced
discussion.
The opinion, up to this point, has unified the two sides of the debate in a
shared goal. From here, the next step, in which the court found that "[t]he
Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals, 222
and therefore held that the Commonwealth may not "deny the protections,
benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the
same sex who wish to marry" 223 is where, ultimately, the two sides diverge. That
is, what each side defines as the "liberty of all" is ultimately different.
Nevertheless, Marshall's narrative was both candid and principled in its attempt
to fairly characterize the debate from both sides. Any opposition, therefore, will
necessarily engage a more meaningful discussion about what is really at issue
rather than falling behind the pretense of fundamental ideas.
By contrasting the two rhetorical approaches, it would seem that Marshall's
approach of judicial candor allows for more traction in finding a productive
solution. Through such candor about the problem of the sexual and gender
binaries to account for all identity, particularly the problem as manifested in legal
discourse, a meaningful, open dialogue can take place such that finding a solution
is a possibility.
IV. JUDICIAL CANDOR AND NUANCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DISTINCTIONS THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE

Marriage, as a civil institution, has been afforded great protection throughout
our nation's history. This is so, in large part, because the law has recognized
marriage's important role in providing for a stable familial structure in which two
people commit to each other. 224 It is within this union that the law has sought to
encourage committed relationships,225 fidelity,226 and the rearing of children.227 In
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essence, marriage is the site of the rearing of our society. 228 It is pivotal, therefore,
that marriage continue to be protected as a right that is equally and equitably
available to all people.
While the institution of marriage as it stands today has several inherent
problems that have not been addressed in this Comment, the resulting inequality
of lines drawn on the basis of one's gender has been discussed at length. By
looking at the current jurisprudence of marriage within the contexts of sexual
orientation and gender identity issues, this Comment has sought to expose the
inadequacy of the categories on which these decisions were based. In the sexual
orientation context, these cases relied on the distinction between the categories of
heterosexual and homosexual. In the gender cases, the decisions rested on the
courts' interpretation of the notion of gender and the view that that notion is
immutable. As such, the courts denied a transgender person the legal recognition
of her gender because of their unwillingness to recognize a same-sex marriage.
Through Alyson's story, this Comment suggested that the terms
"heterosexual" and "homosexual" as well as "male" and "female" are arbitrary.
To be precise, Alyson's situation calls into question such categories and locates
the relationship between Alyson and Jeffrey on the universal spectrum of desire.
By exposing the inadequacy of the current gender binary, this Comment has
suggested that naming that which is taboo is a possible step in exposing and
breaking down the gender binary, which coerces all people to perform their
gender in one way or another.229
In sum, then, this Comment proposes that gender and sexual orientation as
categories do not add anything significant to the ongoing cultural debate about
the meaning of civil marriage. Indeed, as the foregoing discussion of how the law
treats transgender people has demonstrated, the truly simple binary of marriage
categories that constitute current marriage law are so arbitrary as to exclude
deserving couples from its meaning and protection without any credible
justification. From here, open-ended and candid legal discourse will provide the
foundation from which a principled solution might begin. Without such
discourse, this remains a situation of a distinction without a meaningful
difference.
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For a discussion on the performativity of gender, see generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
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